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ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER PRE-DISPUTE
AGREEMENTS: WILL GILMER SURVIVE?*
Michael Delikat**
Reng Kathawala***

I.

INrRODUCTION

Arbitration as a method of alternate dispute resolution ("ADR")
has a long tradition in American jurisprudence.! Congress declared the
public policy favoring arbitration in 1925, when it enacted the United
States Arbitration Act, today called the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 2 The FAA provides that valid, written arbitration clauses in
contracts involving transactions in, inter alia, interstate commerce, are
enforceable in the courts of the United States.3 Accordingly, the FAA
expresses a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.4 That policy has
been articulated at all levels of the federal judicial system, including the
United States Supreme Court.5

* An earlier version of this Article appears in PLI LrTIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES No. H0-001C 483 (1998).
** Michael Delikat, B.S., Cornell University 1974, J.D., Harvard Law School 1977, is the
co-chair of the Employment Law Department at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. Orrick represents many major employers in the financial services and other industries in connection with their
alternative dispute resolution programs.
•**
Ren6 Kathawala, B.A., New York University 1993, J.D., University of North Carolina
School of Law, is an associate in the Employment Law Department at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
1. For a history of alternative dispute resolution, see Bette J. Roth et al., THE ALTERNATIVE
DISPurERESoLUTIONPRACMICEGUIDE, § 1.1 (1993).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); see also
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76
(1988) (holding that where issues are susceptible to, but not clearly the subject of an arbitration
clause, doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
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The use of arbitration in certain industries to resolve disputes has a
tradition that even predates the FAA. For example, participants in the

securities industry have created their own organizations, rules, and
practices to promote the fair and efficient operation of the financial

markets for over 150 years.6 One long-established industry practice has
been the use of arbitration, rather than litigation, to resolve disputes.
Indeed, arbitration has been widely used in the securities industry since
at least 1817.8
Nevertheless, despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements which
clearly affirm the "national policy favoring arbitration," the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements when dealing with statutory
discrimination claims, sometimes referred to as "mandatory arbitration," is under siege in the courts, administrative agencies and even in
the legislatures. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
preclude the compulsory arbitration of Title VII disputes.9 Other courts,
including one circuit court of appeals decision which post-dated and
specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading of the legislative history

surrounding the 1991 Civil Rights Act, continue to find that pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are enforceable and consistent with the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, making this issue now ripe for Supreme Court review, despite the Court's decision to deny certiorari in
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.l°

6. See, e.g., NASD Manual-Code of Arbitration Procedure; New York Stock Exchange
Guide-Arbitration Rules.
7. See Edward R. Morris Jr. et al., Securities Arbitrationat Self-Regulatory Organizations:
New York Stock Exchange, Inc., & NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers,Inc.: Administration and Procedures,in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 141 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Course Handbook Series No. B4-7006, 1992).
8. See id.
9. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3113, 67 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-237); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 212 (D. Mass.), appeal
pending, No. 98-1246 (lst Cir. argued July 27, 1998) (invalidating compulsory arbitration of
claims pursuant to Title VII and ADEA); Hooters of Am. Inc. v. Phillips, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1757, 1781 (D.S.C. 1998) (finding pre-dispute arbitration agreement to be a contract of
adhesion and thus unenforceable). But see Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) which stated,
"Mere inequality of bargaining power... is not sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable .... ).
10. 144 F.3d 1182(9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3113,67 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-237); Seus, 146 F.3d at 179; see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing arbitration agreement which provided for procedural
safeguards). But see Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc. 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding arbitration agreement unenforceable because it deprived the employee of any
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This article examines the arguments underlying the latest challenges to pre-dispute arbitration agreements, whether pursuant to a private agreement to arbitrate or pursuant to the rules of various selfregulatory organizations ("SRO's") with whom employees are required
to register. It also addresses the challenges raised to pre-dispute arbitration agreements by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and Congress, discusses the recent decision by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to approve a National Association of Securities
Dealers Inc. ("NASD") proposal to end the requirement that brokerdealers arbitrate statutory claims of employment discrimination, and the
decision by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") to no longer require its employees to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims, subject
to SEC approval. The article also provides practical advice for parties
who, in the face of these developments, desire to maintain or implement
a system of private mandatory arbitration for their employees.

II. ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES

In jurisdictions where arbitration agreements are specifically enforceable, enforcement is nevertheless subject to a variety of defenses.
Some of these defenses apply to contracts in general, including that the
agreement to arbitrate was procured by fraud, is unconscionable or a
contract of adhesion. Other defenses are specific to agreements to arbitrate claims, such as that the claim is not subject to arbitration or that
the agreement is unenforceable under the FAA.
The following theories have been asserted in recent cases by parties challenging the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate employment disputes: the employee is asserting a federal statutory discrimination claim which is not subject to mandatory arbitration under the 1991
Civil Rights Act;"1 the arbitration agreement denies the employee some
of the remedies available under law; 12 the arbitration procedures violate
the employee's constitutional rights; 3 the employee did not knowingly
and voluntarily agree to arbitrate this claim; 4 the arbitration agreement

meaningful relief while imposing high costs on the employee).
11. See infra Part ll.B.
12. See infra Part Il.C.
13. See infra Part ll.D.
14. See infra Part l.E.
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is an unconscionable contract of adhesion; 5 the arbitration agreement is
not enforceable because the Federal Arbitration Act contains an exception for arbitration clauses in employment contracts;16 the employee is
asserting a state statutory claim that is not subject to arbitration;" the
employee is asserting a claim on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons and the arbitration procedures do not allow for the adjudication
of class action claims; 8 and the employee is entitled to a jury trial under
the Federal Arbitration Act to determine whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists. 9
A. The United States Supreme Court Has Held That FederalStatutory
DiscriminationClaims Are ArbitrablePursuantTo Pre-Dispute
Agreements
The question of whether federal statutory employment-related
claims such as those asserted pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),2° the Americans With Disabilities Act22
("ADA"), 2' and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
are subject to arbitration, at least in the absence of a law precluding
arbitration, was answered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corporation,2 in at least one context. In Gilmer,
the Court held that there was no absolute right of access to the court
system to pursue an ADEA claim.24 Upholding the arbitrability of employment claims in the securities industry, the Court cited the liberal
policy of the federal courts favoring arbitration and reasoned that (1)
arbitration of ADEA claims would not be contrary to legislative intent
or the statute's remedial and deterrent purposes; (2) arbitration would
not undermine the enforcement powers of the EEOC because claimants
would still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, which has independent authority to investigate age discrimination claims; (3) arbitration can
provide a fair forum for hearing claims and can afford broad relief to
claimants; and (4) inequality of bargaining power between employers

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part II.F.
See infra Part ll.G.
See infra Part H.H.
See infra Part 111..
See infra Part V.B.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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and employees is not a sufficient reason to reject arbitration agreements,
absent evidence of coercion or fraud.'
Gilmer resolved a conflict between courts that had upheld arbitration of age discrimination and other statutory employment claims and
those that refused to compel arbitration of such disputes.26 Because of
the specific facts presented, Gilmer, on its face, can be read to hold that
arbitration agreements between employees and regulatory or licensing
bodies are enforceable to compel arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims.
For instance, in Williams v. Cigna FinancialAdvisors, Inc.,27 a decision following Gilmer, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") does not bar predispute arbitration of employment disputes.8 In so doing, the Court of
Appeals determined that a discharged employee's Form U-429 required
arbitration of his age discrimination claim. In Williams, the discharged
employee seeking to avoid arbitration argued that his agreement to arbitrate was not enforceable because he had not knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to a judicial forum, as required by the OWBPA. 3' The
OWBPA requires a written "knowing and voluntary" waiver by the
employee which refers specifically to claims under the ADEA. 2 In rejecting the employee's argument, the court reasoned that "[t]here is no
indication that Congress intended the OWBPA to affect agreements to
arbitrate employment disputes. 33 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "OWBPA protects against the waiver of a right or claim, not
against the waiver of a judicial forum."'

25. See id. at 27-33.
26. CompareBird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1991)
(upholding arbitration of ERISA claim) with Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 231 (3d
Cir. 1989) (denying arbitration of ADEA claim).
27. 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995).
28. See Williams, 56 F.3d at 660-61.
29. The Form U-4 (Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration) is a uniform,
standardized form which must be completed by anyone seeking to work as a broker in the securities industry. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 193
(D. Mass. 1998). The form requires all brokers to agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy between the broker and the firm, customer or any person, that is required to be arbitrated
under the rules or by-laws of the organizations listed, including the NYSE and NASD. See id.
30. See Williams, 56 F.3d at 659.
31. See id. at 660.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994).
33. Williams, 56 F.3d at 660.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in Kahalnik v. John Hancock Funds,35 the plaintiff argued that the Form U-4 arbitration agreement he signed violated the

OWBPA.36 The court disagreed, holding that "the arbitration agreement
does not violate the OWBPA which only bars the waiver of substantive
rights and not the waiver of a particular judicial forum in which to adjudicate those rights. 37
Because the arbitration agreement in Gilmer was between the employee and the NYSE, the Gilmer opinion declined to consider the
broader question of whether arbitration agreements between employees
and their employers are enforceable with respect to such claims."5 Thus,
Gilmer arguably left open the question of whether arbitration clauses in
employment contracts, as opposed to arbitration clauses in the Form U4, can be used to compel arbitration of employment discrimination
claims. Nonetheless, many federal courts have relied upon Gilmer to enforce employment-related arbitration agreements with respect to a broad
range of statutory employment claims.39
Nevertheless, despite the willingness of virtually all courts to compel parties to arbitration in the immediate aftermath of Gilmer, a number of recent decisions involving the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements have either struggled to distinguish Gilmer or
otherwise cast doubt about the continuing viability of pre-dispute arbitration as an alternate dispute resolution method.

35. No. 95 C 3933, 1996 WL 145842 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1996).
36. See id. at *3.
37. Id.
38. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
39. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. All Agent Actions, 133
F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (RICO); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997)
(FMLA); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995) (ADEA); Pritzker v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) (ERISA); Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (Title VII); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (Title VII); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968
F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992) (Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 947
F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1991) (RICO); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.
1991) (Title VII); Ahing v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 646 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (Title VII); Satarino v. A.G. Edwards & Sons., 941 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (ADA
and FMLA); Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 906 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Title VII and §
1981); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (Title VII and §
1981). But see Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 3779, 1998 WL 344802 (S.D.N.Y. June
23, 1998); Arthur v. Jones Chems., Inc., No. 94-CV-6200L, 1995 WL 930797 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
1995).
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B. Does The 1991 Civil Rights Act Make Pre-DisputeArbitration
Agreements Unenforceable With Respect To Title VII Claims? A Split In
The CircuitsDevelops
In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Company,.4 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that employers may not require as a condition of employment that
employees waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum and instead
agree in advance to submit all employment-related disputes to binding
arbitration.' Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the court, found that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes compulsory arbitration of Title
VII disputes, and thus permitted Duffield to litigate her sex discrimination claims under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act in federal court.42
In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that before 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co.,4 ' "was widely interpreted as prohibiting compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims."' 44 Although the Court conceded that Gilmer
held that employees who signed Form U-4 applications could be required to arbitrate statutory claims brought under ADEA, the Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, developed prior to the Court's rendering of the Gilmer decision, was
determinative. 45 Seizing on the language in the 1991 Act that parties can
choose to use alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration, to resolve Title VII disputes "where appropriate" and to "the extent authorized by law," the court interpreted the qualifiers as setting forth
"separate and distinct limitations on the conditions and circumstances
under which the arbitration process may be invoked to resolve Title VII
*claims."' After examining the legislative history of the 1991 Act, the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend to include Gilmer within
what was "authorized by law" and clearly expressed the opposite inten-

40. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3113, 67 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-237).
41. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193-1201.

42. See id.
43. 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (holding that an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude litigation of Title VII claims in court because the "purpose and procedures of Title VII... indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VIP').
44. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188.
45. See id.
at 1189.
46. Id.at 1193.
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tion when Congress "rejected a proposal that would have allowed employers to enforce 'compulsory arbitration' agreements. 47
Concluding that the Form U-4 was unenforceable as applied to Title VII claims, the court reasoned that the Form U-4 "compels precisely
what Congress intended to prohibit in the 1991 Act: mandatory re-

quirements under which prospective employees agree as a condition of
employment to surrender their rights to litigate future Title VII claims
in a judicial forum and accept arbitration instead. 4 Moreover,
"[b]ecause every employer in the securities industry requires its employees to sign Form U-4, the form is especially violative of Congress'
limitations., 49 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit emphasized in its opinion
that Congress did not "preclude employees from agreeing after a claim
has arisento submit the dispute to arbitration. ' 50
Similarly, a federal district court in Massachusetts has also ruled

that agreements compelling arbitration of claims under Title VII are unenforceable.5 ' The court held that while mandatory arbitration of age
discrimination claims was made permissible by Gilmer, the system used
by the New York Stock Exchange, at issue in Rosenberg, was inadequate to protect employee rights, and thus Gilmer was distinguishable.52

47. Id. at 1196.
48. Id. at 1199. InAckerman v. Money Store, No. L-4301-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Union Co. Oct.
15, 1998), a New Jersey trial court followed the lead of the Duffield opinion and ruled that the
employer violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") by conditioning the
plaintiffs continued employment on her signing an arbitration agreement that would have relinquished her right to pursue NJLAD claims either administratively or in a judicial forum. The New
Jersey Division on Civil Rights (the "Division") intervened in the case and argued that conditioning employment on signing an arbitration agreement covering discrimination claims interfered
with the plaintiffs rights under state law. The court agreed with plaintiff and the Division, pointing out that an employee required to sign an arbitration agreement would be forced to relinquish
the right to bring NJLAD claims in court or with the Division, which can investigate and order
remedies without plaintiffs incurring any litigation costs. See Judge Finds New Jersey Law Violations in ConditioningJob on Waiver of Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 203, at AA-1-2 (Oct.
21, 1998).
49. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199. Despite the strong language contained in Duffield, a Callfornia appeals court recently ordered a trial judge to enter summary judgment for a health and fitness club in a sexual harassment suit filed under the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act,
Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900-12996 (West 1997), by a former employee who sought to repudiate an
arbitration pledge contained in an employee handbook. See 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior
Court, Nos. A079501, A079502, 1998 WL 663348, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1998). In a footnote, the court said that the outcome was not governed by Duffield, finding that state rulings upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements despite the state's anti-discrimination statute
continue to be valid regardless of the contrary stance taken by the Ninth Circuit. See id. at *9 n.9.
50. 24 Hour Fitness, 1998 WL 663348, at *9 n.9.
51. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 200 (D.
Mass.), appealpending, No. 98-1246 (1st Cir. argued July 27, 1998).
52. See id.
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The plaintiff, who alleged age and gender discrimination, as well as sex
harassment, signed a standard Form U-4 requiring her to submit disputes to arbitration under the rules of, among other organizations, the
NYSE. 3 Although plaintiff acknowledged signing the document, she
stated that she was never advised that the Form U-4 required her to arbitrate all future disputes with her employer, including employment disputes.'
The court in Rosenberg acknowledged that Gilmer upheld the enforceability of Form U-4 arbitration clauses as they applied to age discrimination claims, but held that the Supreme Court in Gilmer left open
the question of whether claims under Title VII can be arbitrated, and
also "left open the possibility of evaluating the adequacy of the arbitral
forum in specific cases," including those where an ADEA claim is
brought. 5 Judge Nancy Gertner, author of the Rosenberg opinion, stated
that the rationale in Gilmer was inapposite to the case before her because of what she believed to be the "structural biases" of the arbitration
system created by the NYSE.56 Moreover, the court believed it unlikely
that Congress would grant employees new rights (e.g., right to jury trial
in Title VII cases) by enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and yet permit
the "erosion" of that right by sanctioning pre-dispute arbitration agreements.5 7
In Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.,5 the Third Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and held that federal claims where a brokerage firm
discriminated against one of its former employees on the basis of age
and race are subject to arbitration under the parties' Form U-4 agreement. 9 Seus, like Duffield, executed a Form U-4 at the commencement
of her employment.6 In 1996, Seus filed suit against Nuveen, alleging
discrimination in violation of, among other causes of action, Title VII
and ADEA, and the district court compelled Sues to arbitration pursuant
to the Form U-4.6 On appeal, Sues claimed that the Civil Rights Act of

53. See iL at 193.
54. See id. at 193-94.
55. Id. at 206.
56. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 207.

57. See id. at 205.
58. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
59. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 182, 183.

60. See id at 177.
61.

See id. at 178.
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1991 carved out an exception to the Federal Arbitration Act for predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under Title VI 62
The court rejected Seus' argument, holding that on its face, the text
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "evinces a clear Congressional intent to
encourage arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims, not to preclude
such arbitration." 63 Whereas the Duffield court afforded considerable
weight to the remarks of individual legislators and to comments by the
House Committee on Education and Labor, the Third Circuit declared
that "no amount of commentary from individual legislators or committees would justify a court in reaching the result" that the 1991 Act reflects a congressional intent to preclude pre-dispute waivers of a judicial
forum for Title VII claims.6 Accordingly, the court rejected the notion
that the 1991 Civil Rights Act's "straightforward declaration of the full
Congress can be interpreted to mean that the FAA is impliedly repealed
with respect to agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims which were executed by an employee as a condition of securing employment." 6 Although the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the phrase "where appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law" as a codification of the case law regarding arbitration of Title VII claims, the Third Circuit determined that
it most likely referred to arbitration agreements which were lawful under the FAA.6
Moreover, the Third Circuit held that even if it were to accept Duffield's reasoning that the 1991 Civil Rights Act was intended to codify
existing case law, "we would find the text incompatible with the notion
that the law codified was case law inconsistent with a Supreme Court
case decided six months before the passage of the Act," referring to
Gilmer.67
C. ArbitrationAgreements Will Likely Not Be Given Full Effect If They
Do Not ProvideAll Available Statutory Remedies
Courts in at least three judicial circuits have directly held that those
portions of pre-dispute arbitration agreements which do not authorize
the arbitrator to award the employee the full panoply of remedies available under the pertinent federal statute (e.g., Title VII, ADEA) will not

62. See id. at 179.
63. Id. at 182.
64. Seus, 146 F.3d at 182.
65. Id. at 183.

66. See id.
67. Id.
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be enforced." The rationale for such a policy is that the-forum in which
employees' statutory claims are heard is not outcome determinative, but
to deny employees substantive rights bestowed upon them by Congress
violates public policy because it prevents employees from obtaining relief to which the employees are specifically authorized.6'
In Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services,0 the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the logic of Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co.7 to the employment context and held that an arbitration agreement that does not provide all remedies available in court may be unenforceable.72 Although the court in Cole found that the arbitration
agreement provided "for all of the types of relief that would otherwise
be available in court," the court indicated that Gilmer did not permit
employees to waive the substantive rights provided for in Title VII, including attorney's fees and punitive damages.73
Moreover, one court in the Second Circuit refused to enforce that
portion of an employer's arbitration policy which barred employees
from receiving attorney's fees if they won their case in arbitration.74 The
plaintiff in DeGaetano signed an agreement to abide by the employer's
arbitration rules.75 Although the court upheld a motion forcing plaintiff
to arbitrate her claims rather than allow her to bring them in federal
court,7 6 the court ruled that "forcing an employee to arbitrate important
statutory claims pursuant to a valid employment agreement, and forcing
her to do so in a forum or under an agreement that affords her less than
the full measure of rights granted by the statute, are two very different
things."77 The court stated that its ruling was bolstered by comments
made by the EEOC and NASD in which the two agencies expressed opposition to mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination
claims
7
as a condition of employment in the securities industry. 1
68. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Graham Oil
Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1994), amended, 95 C.D.O.S. 1888 (9th Cir.);
De Gaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
69. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
70. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
71. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), amended,95 C.D.O.S. 1888 (9th Cir.).
72. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
73. Id.
74. See DeGaetano v. Smith Barney Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
75. See id. at 460.
76. See id. at 466.
77. Id.
78. See also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1058 (1lth Cir. 1998)
("the presence of an unlawful provision in an arbitration agreement may serve to taint the entire
arbitration agreement, rendering the agreement completely unenforceable;" arbitration agreement
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Employees asserting federal statutory employment discrimination
claims also have asserted as a defense to arbitration that these claims

must be adjudicated in federal court because of the right to jury trial. In
Nghiem v. NEC Electronic Inc.," the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that because the 1991 amendments to Title VII provide

for trial by jury, an arbitration agreement governing such claims is unenforceable. 0 The court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not
"evince a congressional intent to preclude arbitration; it merely defines
those procedures which are available to plaintiffs who pursue the federal
option, as opposed to arbitration."'" Moreover, the court recognized that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly encourages alternative dispute
resolution, including arbitration, "to the extent authorized by law. 8 2

not enforced because applicant could not secure full statutory remedies in arbitration); O'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding FMLA claim compelled to arbitration but employee cannot give up substantive rights available under the statute); Cosgrove v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 44,602, 88,469 (6th Cir. 1997) ("by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute"); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997) ("resolution of a
claim in an arbitral forum must 'effectively... vindicate [the employee's] statutory cause of action' ... [and] must be accomplished through the use of neutral arbitrators, adequate discovery
[and] adequate types of relief .... ); Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1085 (5th Cir. 1996)
(upholding agreement to arbitrate ERISA claim where waiver of judicial forum "does not carry
with it the waiver of any substantive duties or liabilities"); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co.,
43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994), amended, 95 C.D.O.S. 1888 (9th Cir.) (holding applicant cannot waive right to receive full statutory remedies that would be available in court); Cremin v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1472 (N.D. 11. 1997) ("we've
read Gilmeras requiring the enforcement of arbitration agreements that do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme").
79. 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. See Nghiem, 25 F.3d at 1441.
81. Id.
82.1d.; see also Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997) (holding that inherent in the agreement to arbitrate is a waiver
of the right to jury trial); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that forfeiture of right to jury trial in a FLSA claim is not a deprivation of a substantive right);
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the OWBPA
protects against waiver of a right or claim, not against waiver of a judicial forum); Kahalnik v.
John Hancock Funds, No. 95 C 3933, 1996 WL 145842, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1996) ("the arbitration agreement does not violate the OWBPA which only bars the waiver of substantive rights
and not the waiver of a particular judicial forum"). But see Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 205-06 (D. Mass. 1998), appealpending, No. 98-1246
(1st Cir. argued July 27, 1998) (finding that Congress intended to protect the right of a jury trial
for Title VII claims against mandatory arbitration of employment disputes).
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D. ConstitutionalChallenges To ArbitrationPursuantto the Form U-4
Along with a general attack on the compatibility of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements with the federal statutory employment
discrimination statutes such as Title VII and ADEA, employees in the
securities industry have challenged mandatory arbitration as being
constitutionally infirm. The first hurdle for an employee to overcome in
making a constitutional challenge to arbitration is finding state action."
Obviously, an arbitration agreement written and implemented by a private employer will not amount to state action. However, in several recent cases, including Duffield, employees have asserted that the requirement to arbitrate found in the Form U-4 is the product of state
action for the following reasons: (1) the requirement by the SEC that all
securities traders be registered; (2) the "plenary" regulation of the exchanges by the SEC; (3) the exercise of the judicial power by arbitrators
in hearing and deciding employment-related disputes; (4) the involvement of the SEC in the development of the Form U-4 and in the exchanges' arbitration rules; and (5) the action of the courts in compelling
arbitration and confirming awards. These arguments, nonetheless, have
so far been consistently rejected and may become moot given the
NASD's rule change effective January 1, 1999, which eliminates the requirement that broker-dealers are required to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims pursuant to the Form U-4, and the decision by the NYSE to eliminate the requirement that its employees
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims, subject to SEC approval."
For example, Duffield argued that the Form U-4 is unconstitutional
because it required her to forfeit her Fifth Amendment right to due
process, her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and her right to an
Article III judicial forum. 6 The Ninth Circuit rejected Duffield's contention, finding that although private entities like the NYSE and NASD
may be held to constitutional standards if their actions are "fairly attributable" to the government, the court decided that there was no evidence to support that conclusion.' Specifically, the court found that:
federal law did not require that broker-dealers register with a national
securities exchange until 1993 (after Duffield signed the Form U-4); the
83. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3113, 67 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-237).
84. See id. at 1200-02.
85. See id. at 1186 n.1.
86. See id. at 1200.
87. See id. at 1201-02.
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SEC's involvement in approving NASD rules is insufficient to make the
arbitration requirement fairly attributable to the government; and the
NASD and the NYSE do not evoke governmental authority through
their arbitration system." Similarly, other courts have rejected the argument that arbitration pursuant to the Form U-4 amounts to state action
where
the individual was not required by statute or regulation to regis89
ter.
Similarly, a court in the Second Circuit rejected a claim brought by
a registered representative who refused to sign a Form U-4, and who
contended, among other things, that the mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims violated her constitutional rights.9 The plaintiff, who
apparently was unhappy with being required to sign the Form U-4 in
prior jobs, struck out the mandatory arbitration provision in the Form U4 when she accepted employment with her new employer.9 ' The NASD
subsequently advised the employer's compliance department that an altered form would not be permitted, but plaintiff refused to submit an
unaltered Form U-4. 2 The employer subsequently revoked its offer of
employment because plaintiff could not become registered.93 The court
stated that although "neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held specifically that the mandatory
arbitration clause of Form U-4 can apply to a claim under Title VII, the
weight of authority from other circuits clearly supports such a conclusion," and thus, no constitutional provision barred enforcement of the
validly entered agreement.4
Security industry employers may not have heard the end of this argument. The Northern District of California is currently considering an
identical constitutional challenge to the Form U-4 arbitration requirement in Prassas v. Smith Barney, Inc.95 However, in Prassas,unlike
Duffield, the plaintiff-employee contends that he was a broker-dealer
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1934 and that he registered
after the SEC adopted a new regulation 6 which requires individual bro88. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201-02.
89. See, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460,
1466 (N.D. I. 1997); Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., 949 F. Supp. 580, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Datek
Sec. Corp. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 230, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
90. See Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
91. See id. at 519.
92. See id.

93. See id.
94. Id. at 520.
95. No. 97-8500 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 18, 1996).
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (1997).
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ker-dealers to register with the exchanges of which their firms are
members.97 Since the SEC required him to register as a broker-dealer,
Prassas contends, the arbitration provision contained in his Form U-4 is
a product of state action, subject to constitutional challenge.98
Nevertheless, the whole issue as to the constitutionality of the
Form U-4 will likely become moot given the SEC's decision on June
23, 1998 to approve a NASD proposal to end the requirement that broker-dealers registered with the NASD through the Form U-4 arbitrate
statutory claims of employment discrimination effective January 1,
1999 and the most recent action by the Board of Directors of the NYSE
to no longer require its employees to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims, subject to SEC approval."
E. Challenges to the "Knowing and Voluntary" Nature of Arbitration
Agreements
Another basis on which employees attempt to challenge a motion
to compel arbitration is that they did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the pre-dispute arbitration agreement (i.e., that they did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to a trial in court). Except
for one case which has been limited on its facts,' the arguments by securities industry employees that the Form U-4 should not be enforced
against them because they did not "knowingly" agree to waive their
right to have their claims adjudicated in a courtroom, have been largely
unsuccessful. However, there have been at least three significant cases
decided recently where courts have held "private" arbitration agreements to be unenforceable because the employee did not "knowingly"
waive the right to pursue a court action."0
1.

The Knowing Requirement as Applied to the Form U-4

Employees frequently claim that their agreement to arbitrate was
not "knowing." The requirement that an agreement to arbitrate be
97. See id.
98. See Prassas,No. 97-8500 at 20-22.
99. See generally Arbitration:SEC Approves NASD Proposal To End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-10 (June 24, 1998); New York Stock
Exchange Moves to End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173,
at A-2 (Sept. 8, 1998).
100. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
101. See infra Part ll.E.2.
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"knowing" typically originates in the statute from which the claim
arises. 2
The courts in only one federal circuit have refused to compel arbitration because the employee did not "knowingly" waive the right to
pursue statutory rights in court pursuant to the Form U-4.'0 1 In Lai, the
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's order compelling arbitration of
Title VII claims based on the following evidence relating to the arbitration agreement contained in the Form U-4: (1) when the employees
were hired and signed their U-4 Forms, they were told only that they
were applying to take a required test for their employment with the
company; (2) they were directed to sign the U-4 Forms in the relevant
places without being given an opportunity to read them; (3) they were
not advised about the arbitration agreement contained in the U-4 Forms;
(4) they were not given a copy of the NASD Manual containing the actual teims of the arbitration agreement; and (5) the U-4 Forms that the
plaintiffs signed did not describe the type of disputes that the parties
were agreeing to arbitrate."° The Ninth Circuit emphasized Congress's
intent in enacting Title VII that "there ...be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be
deemed to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies
and procedural protections prescribed in [the statute] and in related state
statutes."'0 5 Finding support for plaintiffs' claim that they were deceived
as to the meaning of the Form U-4's arbitration provisions, the court
held that the employees were not required to arbitrate their sexual harassment and gender discrimination claims.'
Nevertheless, Lai appears to be an anomaly because the NASD
rules applicable at the time did not clearly indicate in the Form U-4 that
employment discrimination claims had to be arbitrated. The NASD
amended its arbitration rules in 1993 and it had been more difficult to
plead ignorance of their scope:
Any dispute, claim or controversy... between or among members
and/or associated persons, and/or certain others, arising in connection
with the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activi-

102. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,33 (1991).
103. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. See id. at 1303-05.
105. Id. at 1304.
106. See id. at 1301, 1305; see also Hurst v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 150, 151, 156
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (following Lai and denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration where it
was unclear whether plaintiff understood that by signing her form U-4 she was agreeing to submit
future Title VII claims).
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ties of such associated person(s), or arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such associated person(s) with such
member, shall be arbitrated under this Code .... 207

For example, the trend toward rejecting claims that an arbitration
agreement is not enforceable because the claimant did not understand
(or "know") its scope was recently reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
when it narrowed Lai in Renteria v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America.' The court reaffirmed its holding in Lai that the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure, prior to the 1993 amendments, did not adequately notify Title VII claimants that they were waiving their rights to
bring such claims in court because the language of that agreement did
not refer to employment disputes.1 9 However, the court narrowed its
holding in Lai by ruling that the "knowing waiver" requirement applies
only to claims arising under Title VII "or similar laws."11 This is because, the court explained, the requirement "derives from a recognition
of the importance of the federal policy of protecting the victims of dis-

crimination."..
Besides the Ninth Circuit's limited recognition of the "knowing"
defense to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in Lai, courts
in the other judicial circuits have uniformly rejected this argument to
invalidate the arbitration agreements contained in the employment applications signed by securities industry employees."'
107. NASD Manual-NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10201 (emphasis added);
see also New York Stock Exchange Guide, Vol. II, Rule 347 (providing similarly for arbitration of
"[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization
arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative").
108. 113 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997).
109. See Renteria, 113 F.3d at 1107.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996) (enforcing
arbitration agreement where plaintiff failed to show that the Fair Labor Standards Act carried a
knowing waiver requirement similar to that under Title VII).
112. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff's misunderstanding of Form U-4's arbitration clause will not excuse her contractual obligations under the Form U-4 because she was on sufficient notice of the arbitration clause's coverage); Rice v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1210, 1212 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that subjective knowledge of the scope of the arbitration clause is irrelevant since,
by virtue of signing Form U-4, employee signals he has agreed to all its terms); Randleman v. New
York Life Ins. Co., No. 2:96CV243, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13956, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 1996)
(holding that the allegedly discriminatory act occurred in 1993 after NASD amended its arbitration
provisions to clarify that they cover employment disputes, and thus the employee was on notice
that discrimination claims were covered by the arbitration agreement); Vitone v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 943 F. Supp. 192, 197 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that plaintiff, who filed his claim almost
two years after the NASD amended its provisions to clarify that they cover employment disputes,
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2.

The Knowing Requirement in "Private" Arbitration Agreements

The fact that employees are still able to challenge "private" predispute arbitration agreements successfully

on the basis of the

"knowing" argument is highlighted by another recent Ninth Circuit decision in which the court applied the "knowing waiver" standard set
forth in Lai and refined in Renteria, to an employee's claim under the
ADA."13 In Nelson, the Court ruled 2-1 that the unilateral promulgation
of a mandatory arbitration provision contained in an employee handbook does not constitute a "knowing agreement" by the employee to

waive a statutory remedy provided by a civil rights law." 4 The fact that
the employee signed an acknowledgment that he received the employee
handbook and agreed to read and understand its contents and contact his

supervisor if he had any questions is not sufficient to constitute a
knowing waiver in this context."1 5 Moreover, in Trumbull v. Century
Marketing Corps.,1 6 the court held that an employee did not waive her
right to pursue a jury trial of discrimination claims under Title VII when
she acknowledged receipt of an employee handbook containing a mandatory arbitration clause because the handbook did not explain the significance of the provision.' 17 The court stated that a valid waiver of the

right to a jury trial must be "knowing or clear," a standard not met because "[tihe language of the arbitration clause says nothing about the
arbitration of statutory claims as opposed to contractual disputes, or
about the significance of the right to a judicial forum. For
a waiver to be
'' 8
valid, such language must be present in the agreement.
should have been fully aware that his employment claims were required to be submitted to arbitration); Beauchamp v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(rejecting "knowing" argument and holding that "[tihe Ninth Circuit's rule that a party to an arbitration agreement is not chargeable with knowledge concerning the existence and scope of the
agreement with respect to statutory claims is directly contrary to... well-settled rule[s] of contract
law"); Brown v. Rexhall Indus., Inc., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1002, 1004 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(rejecting claim that plaintiff did not knowingly waive right to pursue employment claim in court
where Form U-4 informed plaintiff that by signing agreement she agreed to abide by Rule 347 of
the N.Y.S.E. Rules of Arbitration); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 5, 6 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that the agreement clearly put employee on notice that he was
required to arbitrate statutory claims because of the Form U-4's explicit language and thus plaintiff's knowing argument fails).
113. See Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1511 (1998).
114. See id. at 762.
115. See id.
116. 12 F. Supp. 2d 683 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
117. See Trumbell, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 684, 687.
118. Id. at 687; see also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1059 (1lth
Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitration provision in employee handbook not enforceable because it

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss1/3

18

Delikat and Kathawala: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims Under Pre-Dispute
1998]
Arbitrationof Employment DiscriminationClaims

Courts generally consider the objective language of the arbitration
agreement at issue when making the "knowing agreement" determination. For example, in Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc.,1 9 the plaintiff
signed an employment agreement which included a requirement that
"any action contesting the validity of this Agreement, the enforcement
of its financial terms, or other disputes shall be submitted to arbitration."'" The plaintiff argued that her sexual harassment and retaliation
21
claims under Title VII were not covered by the arbitration agreement.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the language "other disputes"
was sufficiently broad to encompass Title VII claims."
By contrast, a district court in New Mexico held that an arbitration
agreement which granted the arbitrator authority to award damages for
"breach of contract only, and shall have no authority whatsoever to
make an award of other damages," precluded arbitration of Title VII and
ADEA claims."n Similarly, in Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell,U the
Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected a recent challenge to an arbitration agreement contained in an employment application."l The Mugnano court held that the language of the application which provided that
the employee agreed to arbitrate any "controversy concerning compensation, employment, or termination of employment" adequately notified
the plaintiff that her sex harassment and discrimination claims were
subject to arbitration.'2 The court stated that it was "not aware of any
rule that requires an arbitration agreement to contain a list of the specific claims or causes of action which are subject to arbitration in order

failed to "generally and fairly inform [the employee]-a worker who is presumably not trained to
decipher legalese-that it covers statutory claims, such as Title VII claims"); Hoffman v. Aaron
Kamhi, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 640, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that language in arbitration agreement was ambiguous with respect to whether it covered statutory employment claims and thus no
"knowing" waiver of right to initiate court litigation). But see Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,
113 F.3d 832, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1997) (enforcing arbitration provision in employee handbook even
though handbook does not qualify as a contract under state law because the arbitration clause is set
forth on a separate page and there is a strong difference in tone and language between the page
containing the arbitration clause and the rest of the handbook); Lepera v. lIT Corp., No. 97-1461,
1997 WL 535165, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1997) (applying New York law, court held at-will employee agreed to arbitration policy in handbook by continuing to work after receipt).
119. 87 F.3d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
120. Rojas, 87 F.3d at 746.
121. See id at 747.
122. See id. at 749.
123. Alcaraz v. Avnet, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D.N.M. 1996).
124. 677 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
125. See Mugnano-Bornstein,677 N.E.2d at 247.
126. Id.
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to be enforceable."' 2 In fact, the court' stated, "such a requirement
would be unreasonable and impractical."'
Thus, for employees who are registered with the NYSE (or NASD)
pursuant to a Form U-4, the issue of whether they have been apprised
that employment claims are subject to arbitration seems to be settled.
However, those securities industry employers who wish to develop arbitration agreements for their non-registered employees, or impose mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements on registered NASD brokers
on or after January 1, 1999, when the NASD requirement that all broker-dealers must mandatorily arbitrate statutory discrimination claims is
eliminated, or on registered NYSE brokers in the event that the SEC approves the NYSE's proposal to eliminate the mandatory arbitration of
statutory employment claims, should draft such agreements carefully to
refer to employment claims expressly. Specifically, employers who
wish to implement a pre-dispute arbitration agreement should keep the
following in mind: (1) any pre-dispute arbitration agreement should
clearly state that it is an agreement to arbitrate employment-related
claims and that arbitration will be the exclusive remedy to resolve such
disputes; (2) if possible, define those employment-related disputes
which must be submitted to arbitration, i.e., all issues related to compensation, benefits, termination or all disputes arising under Title VII or
other anti-discrimination laws; and (3) always give the employee an opportunity to read the arbitration agreement before signing, and if the
arbitration agreement' is promulgated in a revision to an existing employee manual, new acknowledgment forms for current employees may
be in order.
3.

The Voluntary Requirement

Employees are increasingly challenging agreements to arbitrate by
asserting that they did not voluntarily waive their right to pursue their
claims in court. The voluntary requirement is analogous to the knowing
requirement.129 The first question an employer must ask itself in responding to such a charge is what claims are being asserted and where
does the "voluntary waiver" requirement derive from. For example,
constitutional claims may only be waived knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently." 0 On the other hand, no court has found such a require127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supraParts ilE.1-2.
130. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C.,
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ment in Title VII. Even the OWBPA, which expressly requires that a
waiver of an age discrimination claim pursuant to ADEA be knowing
and voluntary, has not been construed to preclude a mandatory, predispute arbitration clause.'
Most employers who have implemented arbitration programs require employees to sign such agreements as a condition of employment.
Employees who are broker-dealers under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 are required, as a condition of employment, to register.'3 2
By virtue of registering with the NYSE or NASD (for the NASD, only
until January 1, 1999, and for the NYSE, only until and when the SEC
approves the NYSE proposal to eliminate the requirement that brokers
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims) pursuant to a Form U-4, the
employee currently agrees to arbitrate all employment disputes with his
or her employer under the auspices of the exchange. 3 Increasingly,
plaintiffs are claiming that pre-dispute arbitration-that is, arbitration
agreements they are forced to sign as a condition of employment-are
unenforceable because they are not voluntary."
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp." *'rejected such an involuntariness argument.'36 Gilmer entered
into an arbitration agreement by signing a Form U-4 because he was
"required by his employment" as a securities representative to register
with the NYSE. Although the Supreme Court declined to hold that
unequal bargaining power could never invalidate an agreement to arbitrate, it found no reason not to enforce Gilmer's arbitration agreement.'38
F. Mandatory, Pre-DisputeArbitrationAgreements May Be Opposed
as Adhesory and Unconscionable
Employees trying to avoid the language of employment agreements
have claimed, with little success until recently, that the arbitration
clauses contained within the employment agreement are products of

Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985).
131. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir.
1995).
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (1997).
133. See New York Stock Exchange Guide, Vol. II, Rule 347; NASD Code
of Arbitration

Procedure, Rule 10201.

134. See Prassas v. Smith Barney, Inc, No. 96-2303, at 12 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct.
18, 1996).
135. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

136. See id. at 33.
137. See id. at 20.
138. See id. at 35.
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unequal bargaining power and/or39 that their agreements were exacted

from them as conditions for hire.'
Since Gilmer, courts have, until recently, uniformly rejected the
attempts of plaintiff/employees, especially those in the securities industry, to avoid written arbitration agreements by arguing that the agreement was fraudulently induced, unconscionable or a contract of adhesion. For example, in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bahr," the plaintiff
stockbroker contended that he was fraudulently induced and coerced
into signing an arbitration agreement by PaineWebber employees.' 4 ' In
rejecting plaintiff's contention that the arbitration clause contained in
his Form U-4 and a separate agreement contained in his employment
contract were fraudulently induced and were a product of coercion, duress and adhesion, the court focused on plaintiff's sophistication as a

highly successful stockbroker with a strong bargaining position, and
noted that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the
42
employment context."'

139. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Aaron Kamhi, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 640, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that plaintiffs bare allegation that bargaining power was unequal simply because defendant was his prospective employer will not render arbitration agreement unenforceable). The concept of "contracts of adhesion" arose with the development of standardized form contracts, and is
defined as a contract in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it proposition under which the only altemative to complete adherence is outright rejection. See E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACrS § 4.26, at
480 (2d ed. 1990). In an adhesion contract, the bargaining power is inherently unequal, because
one party controls the terms and drafting of the agreement, which the other party may not even
read before signing, and the terms are not subject to negotiation. See id. Nonetheless, courts do not
find that unequal bargaining power, as such, makes a contract unenforceable, and courts are usually unresponsive to parties attempting to avoid contracts by simply claiming adhesion. See id. at
481. Instead, courts presume that the parties are aware of the terms and conditions and have entered into an enforceable contract. See id
140. No. 94-36026, 1996 WL 540164 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996).
141. See Bahr, 1996 WL 540164, at **1.
142. l at **5 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)); see
also Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Mason, No. 95-55343, 1996 WL 341758, at **2 (9th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that an arbitration agreement which did not provide for discovery or legal counsel was unenforceable because it was an unconscionable contract of adhesion);
Lepera v. ITT Corp., No. 97-1461, 1997 WL 535165, at *4-*5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding
that the contract of adhesion argument fails under New York law in absence of allegation that
employee was prevented from reading arbitration agreement, denied an explanation, or subject to
high pressure or deceptive tactics); Beauchamp v. Great W. Life Ins. Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp.
1091, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (enforcing arbitration agreement because a party is charged with
knowledge of the terms of a contract and there was no suggestion that execution of Form U-4 was
procured by fraud or deception); Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D.
Minn. 1993) (enforcing arbitration agreement because well-founded claim that arbitration agreement resulted from sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for
revocation of any contract was absent).
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Nevertheless, two recent cases may be changing the receptivity of
courts to arguments by plaintiffs that at least certain arbitration agreements may be contracts of adhesion. 43 In Hooters of America, Inc. v.
Phillips,'4 a federal district court in South Carolina ruled that an arbitration agreement signed by employees of the restaurant chain Hooters
was an unenforceable contract of adhesion, and thus denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration on plaintiffs sexual harassment
claims under Title VI 45 The court found the arbitration agreement to
be unenforceable because, in part, Hooters failed to provide employees
with the complete written terms of the proposed contract and threatened
its employees' careers if they refused to execute the agreement. 46 Hooters "presented [the agreement to] its employees on a take-it or agreenever-to-be promoted basis," the court stated in holding the agreement
to be an unlawful contract of adhesion. 47 "Striving to locate an enforceable arbitration agreement from the few non-offensive provisions of the
Hooters Rules simply rewards Hooters for its unconscionable conduct in
compiling such Rules," the court wrote. 48 Further, the agreement unlawfully prohibited any court review
despite stating that the FAA governed
49
agreement.1
the
of
the terms
In Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,' the court held that the agreement to
arbitrate was a procedurally unconscionable contract of adhesion due to
the imbalance of power between the employer and employee. 5 ' Noting
that the employee was a successful and sophisticated corporate executive, the court based this determination on the findings that the terms of
the employment contract were presented to him after he accepted employment, he was told that the terms were not negotiable, and the contract was presented on a "take it or leave it" basis. 52 Due to this onesidedness, the court concluded that the agreement was invalid since the
employee did not willingly agree to arbitrate his claims. 5 3 It is important to note, however, that the Stirlen court's reliance on its view of the
143. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1757 (D.S.C.
1998); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
144. 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1757 (D.S.C. 1998).
145. See Hooters,75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1780.
146. See id. at 1772-73.
147. Id. at 1790.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1770.
150. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
151. See Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
152. See id. at 146.
153. See id.
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inequality of bargaining power is facially inconsistent with the Gilmer
decision. The fact that the arbitration clause in Stirlen was so one-sided,
eliminating remedies and curtailing the statute of limitations, may have
influenced that court's decision.
The argument that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable has

been alternatively stated as contending that the arbitration procedures of
the NYSE and NASD are, in themselves, discriminatory or otherwise so
deficient as to render any agreement to arbitrate pursuant to them unenT 4 The recent decision in Rosenberg v. Merrill
forceable.'
Lynch, Pierce
& Smith, Inc.'5 was the first time that a court ruled that the arbitration
process established
by one of the self-regulatory organizations was
"unfair."'i 6 There remains at least one prominent pending litigation
which has raised the same issue. I"7 The purported deficiencies of the
NYSE and NASD arbitration procedures which employees commonly
cite include: (1) the alleged bias of arbitrators due to the demographics
of the arbitrator pool; (2) the lack of written opinions; (3) the purported
bias of arbitrators due to their selection by the exchanges; (4) the alleged lack of training, legal or otherwise, for arbitrators; (5) the lack of
a requirement that arbitrators strictly follow the law, including the Federal Rules of Evidence; (6) the limited judicial review of arbitration
awards; (7) the limited discovery; (8) the potential for claimants to be

assessed forum fees; and (9) the private nature of arbitration. 5 Most, if
not all of these factors, were referenced by the Rosenberg court.'59

154. Pursuant to the FAA, an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable merely because it is
presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it-basis." 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). The objecting party must also
show that its terms are unconscionable, or that the circumstances surrounding the implementation
of the agreement were revealed by "confusion" or "duress." See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hooters, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1779; Thomas
v. Perry, 246 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158 (1988). In Cole, the plaintiff was required, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement that required arbitration of disputes pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469. Relying on Gilmer, the court found
that an employee may be forced to arbitrate claims pursuant to an agreement that is presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. See id. at 1467-68, 1472. However, the court in Cole noted the Supreme
Court's refusal to extend Gilmerto mean that "any sort of arbitration procedure before any manner
of arbitrator would be satisfactory in the adjudication of public rights." Id. at 1482. Therefore, the
Cole court went on to examine the AAA's arbitration procedures to ensure that they provided
"minimal standards of procedural fairness." Id. at 1483.
155. 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
156. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 211 ("Dominance of an arbitral system by one side in the
dispute does not comport with any model of arbitral impartiality, especially when that dominance
takes the form of selecting the entire arbitration pool, appointing the individual arbitration panels,
and making procedural and discovery decisions.").
157. See Prassas v. Smith Barney, No. 97-8500 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 18, 1996).
158. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 198,207.
159. See id.
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With respect to a challenge that arbitration procedures are deficient, rendering the arbitration agreement unconscionable, the question
of whether the FAA or state law governs may win the war. Most courts
which have considered the issue have held that if an agreement is subject to the FAA, the FAA's standards of unconscionability control.' 60
G. FederalArbitrationAct Exception to Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements is Extremely Limited
Section 2 of the FAA provides for specific enforcement of any
"written provision" for arbitration in any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.' 61 The Supreme Court has held that the
reach of the FAA is as broad as the Commerce Clause.'62 In other words,
if a dispute arises out of a contract between parties either in commerce
or affecting commerce, the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
will be governed by the FAA.
However, section 1 of the FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
63
commerce."'
This proviso raises two issues pertaining to arbitration of employment claims. One issue is its scope - does this language exclude all
contracts of employment within the jurisdictional reach of the FAA, i.e.,
any claim against an employer in or affecting commerce, or only the
claims of workers who themselves are actually engaged in commerce
(or, perhaps, whose employers are actually engaged in commerce, such
as airlines)? The second issue is whether a state law, to the extent it
applies, may compel arbitration of all employment contracts, including
those excepted from the FAA.

160. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that the FAA, under the Supremacy
Clause, controlled in a suit brought by a former employee of a securities brokerage firm); see also
Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the FAA's laws
of arbitrability preempt contrary state laws); Heily v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that state law cannot form a basis for enforceability of an arbitration provision when assessing unconscionability). But cf. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that state unconscionability standards not preempted by FAA, except
in the case of agreements to arbitrate pursuant to NYSE and NASD procedures).
161. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
162. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
163. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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Although Gilmer did not address the issue, decisions since Gilmer
have been consistent with pre-Gilmer cases adopting the view that,
based on the language of the FAA, its legislative history, and the strong

federal policy favoring arbitration, the exemption for employees engaged in interstate commerce should be construed narrowly to apply
only to those persons who are involved literally in the physical movement of goods in interstate commerce, such as seamen, railroad employees, and other similar employees in the transportation industry, and
should not be read to prohibit the arbitration of claims arising from
employment contracts just because the employer is in commerce.
1. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
Those plaintiffs that are unsuccessful in avoiding arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute agreements are increasingly attempting to have their
claims heard in court by seeking broad judicial review of arbitration

164. See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 148 (1st Cir. 1998) (extending
enrollment agreement containing arbitration provision governing the terms of a child's education
at a private school to cover claims under FAA and Rehabilitation Act); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1056 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the issue has not yet been
decided by the Eleventh Circuit); Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (narrowly construing section one to include security guard); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (including medical technologist in 9 U.S.C. § 1: "We are
persuaded by the reasoning of those circuits which have held that section one applies only to contracts of employment for those classes of employees that are engaged directly in the movement of
interstate commerce"); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 299 (1997) (stating that mandatory arbitration applies to mortgage consultant;
reaffirming Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450,
452 (3d Cir. 1953) (en bane) (holding that the exceptions specified in 9 U.S.C. § 1 refer only to
workers actually engaged in interstate commerce)); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d
592, 596 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding employment agreement between consultant and his corporate
employer enforceable and narrowly construing 9 U.S.C. § 1 to apply only "to employment contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are");
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995) (compelling arbitration in ADEA
and fraudulent inducement claims); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934
(9th Cir. 1992) (observing that the issue has not yet been resolved by the Ninth Circuit); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984) (narrowly
construing 9 U.S.C. § 2 to cover brewery employees); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) ("Nor are we impressed by the argument that the excepting clause. . . should be construed as not applying to employees engaged in
the production of goods for interstate commerce ....); Durkin v. CIGNA Property & Cas. Corp.,
942 F. Supp. 481, 486 (D. Kan. 1996) ("[T]he court concludes that the exclusion in section 1 of
the FAA does not encompass all employment claims.., the court is persuaded that the Tenth Circuit would agree with its conclusion."). But see Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F.
Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (holding FAA does not apply to casino employee's employment
agreement).
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awards. The FAA itself allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration
award only in extremely limited circumstances, including "[w]here the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;" "[w]here
there was evident partiality or corruption [by] the arbitrators;" where
there existed specified misconduct by the arbitrators; or "[w]here the
arbitrators exceeded their powers."'65 Courts have fashioned very narrow
standards outside the confines of the FAA when they will overturn an

arbitration award. For example, courts in the Second Circuit have overturned arbitration decisions because of manifest disregard of the law,"61
167
manifest disregard of the contract, compelling a violation of law,'
6
9
violation of strong public policy, and total irrationality. 7 With the exception of the statutory bases for review set forth in the FAA and the
very limited judicially legitimized standards, arbitration awards, until a
recent decision from the Second Circuit, were generally given complete
deference.'
165. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
166. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cit.
1986).
167. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 25 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
168. See Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980).
169. See Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N.Y. 1995).
170. See Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 362 N.E.2d 977, 980 (N.Y.
1997).
171. See, e.g., Gallus Invs., L.P. v. Pudgie's Famous Chicken, Ltd., 134 F.3d 231, 233-34
(4th Cit. 1998) (finding that judicial review of arbitration award is limited to grounds set forth in
FAA and scrutiny for whether award evinces manifest disregard of applicable law); Kiernan v.
Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 594 (8th Cit. 1998) (discussing challenge to arbitration proceeding pursuant to Form U-4, the court held that the "arbitrators' interpretation of the law is insulated
from review," except when "manifest disregard may be shown" or when party satisfies standards
established in FAA); Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 821 (9th Cit. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1385 (1998) (stating that "manifest disregard of the law" is one of the only appropriate reasons to
review and vacate an arbitration panel's decision); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d
1456, 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the non-statutory ground of "manifest disregard of
the law" as an appropriate basis to overturn an arbitration award); Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85
F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996) (the burden on a claimant for vacating an arbitration award is extremely high); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87
F.3d 844, 848, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that the standard for judicial review of arbitration
awards is very limited); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 237-41 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding vacatur appropriate only in unusual circumstances such as when the decision is completely irrational and/or violates public policy); United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban
Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 378, 379 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that arbitration awards are given
great deference by the courts); National Wrecking Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
731, 990 F.2d 957, 960, 961 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the court will reverse arbitration award
only in very unusual circumstances including where the award was made in manifest disregard of
the law); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (limited judicial review of arbitration decisions stems in part from FAA's requirement that "[in reviewing the
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Nevertheless, although the law relating to judicial review of arbitration awards seemed well-settled, the Second Circuit's decision in
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,' 72 appears to create a new standard for
review."' The plaintiff-appellant, Halligan, brought his ADEA claim to
arbitration before the NASD. 74 After twenty-six days of arbitration
hearings in which twenty-five witnesses appeared, more than two hundred and forty exhibits were introduced, and extensive briefs were filed,
the arbitrators issued a written award denying all of Halligan's claims.'
Thereafter, Halligan filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award
which was denied by the district court.171
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the arbitrators
engaged in "manifest disregard of the law or the evidence or both,"
thereby adding a "disregard of the evidence" gloss to the "manifest disregard" standard."' Using this newly enunciated "disregard of the evidence" standard, the Court of Appeals went into an extensive discussion
of the facts of the arbitration, and apparently based its decision on a
disagreement with the arbitrators weighing of the evidence, not on any
perceived refusal by the arbitrators to apply the law.17 1 In addition to
finding that Halligan presented "very strong evidence of age-based discrimination" to the arbitration panel, the Court also held that the arbitrators failed to explain their award. 7 9 Although recognizing that arbitrators have no obligation to explain an award, the Court took the absence
of a reasoned opinion into account in concluding that the arbitrators had
disregarded the law or the evidence or both, thus suggesting that opinions should be written at least in some cases.1 0 However, the Court did
not remand the case to the arbitrators for a reasoned award to enable the
court to determine if the law had been disregarded, but simply reversed
the district court decision below that had refused to vacate the arbitration award." Should the Second Circuit's decision in Halligan withdistrict court's vacatur, we posit the... question... [of]
whether the arbitration proceedings were
fundamentally unfair"); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that judicial review of arbitration award is extremely limited).
172. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
173. See Halligan, 148 F.3d at 203-04.
174. See id. at 198.
175. See Respondent-Appellees' Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing in
Banc at 1-2, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998) (Nos. 97-7801, -7839).
176. The district court's decision was reported as Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 96 Civ.
4472, 1997 WL 191029 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).
177. See Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202, 204.
178. See id. at 198-204.
179. See id. at 198, 200.
180. See id. at 204.
181. See id.; see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
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stand further review, critics of the opinion have argued that the
"'manifest disregard of the evidence' standard will become an invitation
for every losing party in every arbitration to seek judicial review, in
hopes that the reviewing court will conduct its own assessment of each
party's factual presentation."'2
2. Arbitration Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
The arbitrability of a federal statutory employment claim pursuant
to an individual employee's arbitration agreement under Gilmer must
still be distinguished from the arbitrability of such a claim pursuant to
an arbitration agreement in a collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA").
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,' the Supreme Court held that an
arbitration provision in a CBA cannot bar an individual employee from
bringing a statutory discrimination claim in court where the contract at
issue containing the arbitration clause was a CBA agreed upon by the
union but not the individual employee. 1
On November 16, 1998, a unanimous Supreme Court clarified Al8 5 that
exander and ruled in Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp."
a longshoreman covered by a collective bargaining agreement and a
seniority plan including arbitration clauses does not have to arbitrate his
ADA claim.16 Vacating an unpublished decision by the Fourth Circuit,'87
the Court held that the arbitration clause in the CBA between the employer and union did not clearly and unmistakably cover statutory discrimination claims. 8 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court,

(stating that the federal policy favoring arbitration is valid only if "judicial review under the
'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have
properly interpreted and applied statutory law" and noting that a higher standard of review for
arbitration decisions would not significantly undermine the finality of arbitration because most
employment discrimination claims center on factual, rather than legal disputes).
182. Respondent-Appellees' Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc at
14, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998) (Nos. 97-7801, -7839).
183. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
184. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60; see also Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 156
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2706, 2711 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1997) ("An arbitration clause negotiated by a union and employer-located in a document the employee may never see--does not represent
meaningful consent to arbitrate important federal statutory claims like those arising under Title
VII.").
185. No. 97-889, 1998 WL 788796 (Nov. 16, 1998).
186. See Wright, 1998 WL 788796, at *8.
187. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir.
1997, cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
188. See Wright, 1998 WL788796, at *6.*7.
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found that the bargaining agreement's arbitration clause was very general, covering "matters under dispute," and did not explicitly incorporate statutory discrimination claims.' 9 An arbitration clause in the second contract - the long shore seniority plan - also failed to make a
clear and unmistakable waiver of employees' right to a federal judicial
forum for statutory EEOC claims.'O
The Court held that the presumption of arbitrability arising from
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 9' does not extend
beyond disputes over interpretation of a bargaining contract's terms.'1
The Court found that the petitioner's dispute ultimately concerned interpretation of the ADA, not the application or meaning of a bargaining
contract.193
Nevertheless, the Court observed that the Fourth Circuit's decision,
that the CBA's arbitration clause encompassed an ADA claim and was
enforceable against the petitioner, brought into focus the tension between two lives of Supreme Court cases following Alexander and Gilmer.194 However, the Court limited the breadth of its holding because it
found it unnecessary to decide the validity of a union-negotiated waiver
of employee's statutory right to a federal judicial forum.' 9 The Court
found96this because it was clear that there was no such waiver in the
case.
Regardless, the Supreme Court's decision in Wright settles a dispute that had emerged between the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright,
an earlier Fourth Circuit decision, Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Containers,Inc.,'" and the other federal circuit courts of appeal which
had not followed the Fourth Circuit's logic in Wright or Austin. In Austin, the Fourth Circuit required an employee to arbitrate her Title VII
and ADA claims pursuant to the language of the CBA.'98 The plaintiff's
employment in Austin was subject to a CBA which specifically provided that claims of gender and disability discrimination were subject to
the grievance procedure.'" Following the last step of the grievance procedure, the CBA stated that an unsettled dispute "may be referred to
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at *7.
See id. at *8.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
See Wright, 1998 WL 788796, at *6.
See id.
See id. at *5.
See id. at *5-*7.
See id.
78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
See Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-81.
See id. at 879.
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arbitration."' The Fourth Circuit held that "may" means "must" and
that, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver notwithstanding, an agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims is enforceable regardless of whether it is contained in a securities registration application, a simple employment
contract or a CBA.' The Court side-stepped Alexander by noting that
Gilmer rejected the premise in Alexander that arbitration is an inappro-

priate forum for the resolution of Title VII claims.'
Nevertheless, despite Austin, nearly every court outside the Fourth
Circuit presented with the issue had prior to the Supreme Court decision
in Wright expressly rejected Austin and/or its logic, holding that an
employee's contractual rights under a CBA are distinct from the employee's statutory rights pursuant to the federal anti-discrimination

statutes."3

200. Id. at 880.
201. See id. at 885.
202. See id. at 880, 881; see also Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 997 F. Supp 714, 721
(E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that broad arbitration clause in CBA requires arbitration of alleged violations of both contractual and statutory rights); Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 930 F.
Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (agreeing with the reasoning in Austin that "an agreement procured by collective bargaining should not be treated differently" than an arbitration agreement
entered into between private parties); Connors v. Amisub Inc., No. 96-6188-CIV, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13368, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 1996) (finding persuasive the reasoning in Austin that
there is no reason to treat arbitration agreements differently for ADA claims than for Title VII or
ADEA claims).
203. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
No. 97-35500, 1998 WL 696425 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1998) (union-represented employees may file
suit under FLSA without first invoking the grievance-arbitration procedure of the CBA); Penny v.
United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that CBA does not preclude judicial
determination of rights under the ADA); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997) (holding that worker's statutory rights are only arbitrable
if the worker consents to arbitration); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519
(1 lth Cir. 1997) (holding that mandatory arbitration provision in CBA did not preclude employee
from pursuing ADA claim); Matuskey v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, No. CIV.A.96-1594, 1997
WL 161952 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 1997); Vamer v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997) (holding that employee not required to exhaust arbitration remedies under CBA before bringing suit); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996) (holding that plaintiff not required to exhaust his arbitral remedy before filing FLSA claims); LaChance v. Northeast Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177, 184 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding that an arbitration agreement in CBA cannot force employee to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claim); Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2706
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997) (holding that teacher not precluded by arbitration clause from filing sexual harassment claim under Title VII); Coleman v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 984 F. Supp.
576, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that CBA's cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights);
Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that mandatory arbitration
provision in CBA did not preclude employee from pursuing ADA claim).
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H. State Statutory Claims May Also Be Subject to Arbitration
The FAA provides for enforcement of all arbitration agreements to
the extent it applies and it has been held to override state laws which
exclude statutory claims from arbitration.'O4 Cases decided subsequent to
Gilmer generally have applied this principle to hold that state statutory
employment claims are subject to arbitration where the parallel federal
discrimination claim is arbitrable, or where the state statute permits or is
silent as to arbitrability. 2°s
In addition to state statutory claims, employees subject to arbitration agreements may be required to arbitrate common-law claims arising out of their employment. 06
Under the FAA, arbitration is to be compelled "in accordance with
the terms of the agreement."' ' Some contracts containing arbitration
clauses also contain choice of law clauses. The Supreme Court has held
that, when a choice of law clause provides for the application of state
arbitration law, the arbitration clause should be enforced according to
state law. 2 Thus, the only remaining loophole by which an employee
may avoid arbitration is to assert a state statutory employment claim
and then argue that: (1) the pertinent employment agreement calls for
application of state arbitration law; and (2) under state law the alleged
204. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (overriding California wage-and-hour law);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (overriding California Franchise Investment Law).
205. See, e.g., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992)
(California polygraph protection statute); Hall v. MetLife Resources, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (New York Human Rights Law); Trumbetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
2 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 542 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection
Act; Personnel File Act); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993)
(Massachusetts Civil Rights and Equal Rights Acts); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.
Mo. 1993) (Missouri Human Rights Act); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp.
947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (New York Human Rights Law); Moore v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466 (D.NJ. 1991) (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination); Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475 (E.D. Cal. 1991)
(California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 921 P.2d
146 (Haw. 1996) (Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act).
206, See, e.g., Stone v. Pennsylvania Merchant Group, Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that arbitration agreement required employee to arbitrate all disputes arising out of his
employment, not merely those arising out of his employment contract, including a defamation
claim); Kurschus v. PaineWebber, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1652 PKL, 1996 WL 389303 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 1996) (holding that employee was required to arbitrate defamation claim arising out of his
Form U-5, pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the Form U-4).
207. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994); see also Davidson County v. Ground Improvement Techniques,
Inc., 83 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the FAA confers only the right to compel arbitration
in the manner provided for in the parties' agreement).
208. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,470 (1989).
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claim is not arbitrable. However, the viability of this argument is questionable in light of the increasing willingness of state courts to compel
arbitration of state statutory claims under state arbitration law.'
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that if the FAA
governs enforceability of an arbitration contract, then state law cannot
exempt a claim or controversy covered by the contract from arbitration. 210
L Assertion of a Class Action Claim May Avoid the Obligationto
Arbitrate
One novel approach to avoiding arbitration is to assert a claim on
behalf of "all others similarly situated," or on behalf of a class. In one
case, an employee who was ordered to proceed to arbitration pursuant to
the terms of her Form U-4 amended her complaint to assert claims on
behalf of a class of plaintiffs. 211 Similarly, in Olde Discount Corporation
v. Hubbard,2 the court held that a fired stockbroker trainee was not required to arbitrate racial discrimination claims against his former firm
because he filed a class action encompassing those same claims.213 In so
doing, the court rejected the employer's argument that plaintiff should
be compelled to arbitration because plaintiffs "class action suit was
filed in response to [the employer's] petition to compel arbitration. 2 4
The courts in Cremin and Hubbardrefused to compel the plaintiffs
to arbitration because the arbitration rules of the NASD and NYSE expressly prohibit the arbitration of class action claims.' 5 However, they
permit arbitration of the claims of class members who have elected not
to participate in, or have withdrawn from, a class action. 6 While the
209. See, e.g., Spellman v. Securities, Annuities & Ins. Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992).
210. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984),
211. See Amended Complaint at 1, Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill filed Feb. 21 1997) (No. 96 Civ. 3773).
212. 4 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Kan. 1998).
213. See Olde Discount Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1269-72.
214. Id. at 1271.
215. See NASD Manual-Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10301(d)(1); New York Stock
Exchange Guide-Arbitration Rules, Rule 600(d)(i). Arbitration of class claims is disfavored because arbitration of such claims generally is "difficult, duplicative and wasteful." Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration Proceedings,
57 Fed. Reg. 52,659 (1992). On the other hand, "the judicial system has developed the procedures
to [efficiently] manage class action claims." Id.
216. See NASD Manual--Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10301(d); New York Stock

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

33

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

(Vol. 16:83

arbitration rules of the NASD prohibit the arbitration of class action
claims, the rules permit joinder and consolidation of claims.217
Only one federal appellate court has directly addressed the issue of
whether courts have authority under the FAA to order a suit to proceed
to arbitration as a class action where the arbitration agreement is silent
on the issue. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,21 the Seventh Circuit held
that section 4 of the FAA, which requires district courts to enforce arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms, precludes federal
judges from ordering a class arbitration where the parties' arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue.219 The dominant concern in Champ is
that private arbitration agreements are to be viewed as contracts and the
parties to these contracts are free to agree to the terms of the arbitration.'
Several circuit courts have addressed the analogous issue of
whether district courts have the authority to consolidate claims involving common questions of law or fact for arbitration proceedings. 22' The
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
held that absent either an express provision in an arbitration clause or
statutory authority, courts should not order consolidated arbitration. 2
Nevertheless, at least one federal appellate court has held that the FAA
allows for the "consolidation" of claims, and thus permits class arbitrations.2"
II. THE SEC HAS APPROVED THE ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO THE U-4

On June 23, 1998, the SEC announced that it had approved the
NASD's December 1997 proposal to end the requirement that brokerdealer employees arbitrate statutory claims of employment discrimina-

Exchange Guide-Arbitration Rules, Rule 600(d).
217. See NASD Manual-Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10314(d).
218. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
219. See Champ, 55 F.3d at 275.
220. See id.
221. See infra notes 223, 224.
222. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995); Government of the
United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993); American Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193
(8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281 (11th Cir.
1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984).
223. See New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
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tion. " In announcing the rule, SEC Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr.
stated that the rule change "will not address all the issues," because although the NASD will now be taken out of the business of enforcing industry-wide mandatory arbitration agreements, the rule change does not
prevent any brokerage from including pre-dispute arbitration agreements in individual contracts." In the SEC's press release announcing
its decision, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that he encouraged "the
other SROs to promptly change their rules to conform to those of the
NASD." 226
The NASD's rule change occurred after a significant amount of
activity and public debate about the arbitration of employment discrimination disputes during the last year. In February 1997, three members of
Congress (Representatives Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Anna G.
Eshoo (D-Cal.), and Jessie Jackson, Jr. (D-fll.)), wrote to the SEC and
questioned the authority of the NASD and other SROs to require arbitration of discrimination claims in employment disputes through an associated person's signing of the Form U-4.f 7
Accordingly, in response to pressure from Congress, civil rights
advocates and plaintiffs' attorneys, the NASD staff met with various
groups and individuals, including national and regional member firms,
members of NASD Regulation District Committees, management and
employee attorneys, members of the Bar of the City of New York Labor
and Employment Committee, and staff of the New York Stock Exchange.m In general, the groups from or representing the securities industry believed the current practice of requiring mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration of employment claims is fair, and is more cost-effective for
all parties than going to court.29 The groups representing employees
unanimously believed "that the NASD and other SROs should remove

224. As of September 1997, there were approximately 556,000 registered persons with the
NASD. See NASD Regulation Statistics, <http://www.nasdr.com/2320>.
225. See Arbitration:SEC Approves NASD Proposal To End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias
Claims,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-10 (June 24, 1998).
226. l
227. See Mark P. Zimmett, Recent Developments in Arbitrationof Employment Disputes, 219
N.Y.L.J. 1, 7 (1998).
228. See Letter and attachments from Joan C. Conley, Corporate Secretary, National Association of Securities Dealers, to Katherine A. England, Assistant Director of Division of Market
Regulation,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
(visited
Jan.
29,
1998)
<http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/rf97-77al.txt> [hereinafter Letter from Joan C. Conley]
(addressing section entitled "Recent NASD Actions" in attachments).
229. See id,
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the requirement for registered persons to arbitrate employment discrimination disputes as a condition of registration in the industry. ' 30
After consideration of all the views presented, and "in light of the
public perception that civil rights claims may present important legal
issues better dealt with in a judicial setting," the NASD determined that
the appropriate action was to remove the arbitration requirement for
statutory and sexual harassment claims.23' The rule effective January 1,
1999, provides in relevant part: "A claim alleging employment discrimination, including a sexual harassment claim, in violation of a statute is not required to be arbitrated. Such a claim may be arbitrated only
if the parties
have agreed to arbitrate it, either before or after the dispute
232
arose."
Accordingly, the new NASD policy produces three significant consequences: (1) member firms would still be able to impose "private"
pre-dispute arbitration agreements with their brokers; (2) common law
(and not statutory) claims would still be required to be submitted to
arbitration; and (3) member firms that use private arbitration agreements with their employees would have to specify an arbitration forum
that meets standards similar to those 233
articulated in the American Bar
Association's "Due Process Protocol.
Because the rule is limited to statutory employment discrimination
claims, common law claims (e.g., unpaid compensation, defamation,
tortious invasion of privacy), which are often brought in conjunction
with statutory claims, will still be subject to mandatory arbitration,
thereby raising the possibility of bifurcation. 2 4 Typically, the state
common law claims involve the same or separate aspects of the employment relationship. 235 Nonetheless, under the NASD rule, the statutory discrimination claims could be litigated in court, while the common
law claims would have to be decided in arbitration.
Among the problems that bifurcation will generate are increased
expenses for both sides, parallel proceedings that may even be ongoing
in different states with different lawyers, pretextual court filings to

230. Id.
231. Linda D. Feinberg, Mandatory Arbitration in Securities Industry, CONG. TESTIMONY,
July 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12763195.
232. NASD Notice to Members, NASD NTM No. 98-56 (July 1998), available in 1998
NASD LEXIS 71 (emphasis added).
233. See Letter from Joan C. Conley, supra note 228.
234. See Letter from Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission 2 (Jan. 6, 1998) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law

Journal).
235. See id.
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augment discovery in arbitration, and complex issues of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. 6
Despite these concerns, the Board of Directors of the NYSE followed the NASD's decision and announced on September 3, 1998 that
it, like the NASD, had decided to no longer require its employees to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims 3 7 The move, which affects
thousands of stock brokers at the NYSE, 479 member firms, as well as
other exchange members and employees, still requires formal approval
from the SEC, which will likely be given.38 Pursuant to the new rule, if
adopted, arbitration in employment disputes where discrimination is alleged will be permitted only in situations where both the claimant and
the firm agree to it.3 The amended language to NYSE Rule 347 would
read: "A claim alleging employment discrimination, including any sexual harassment claim, in violation of a statute shall be eligible for arbitration only where the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it
has arisen."'240
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OPPOSE MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
ARBrrRATION

A. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
According to the EEOC, while individuals can waive an existing
Title VII claim if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily, any
agreement to waive rights prospectively-that is, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement-cannot be knowing and voluntary2' On May 17, 1996,
the EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief in Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 242 arguing that if the court enforced the arbitration agreement signed by Johnson, a former broadcasting employee, it would be
the equivalent of the plaintiff waiving her rights under Title VIIE3L According to the plaintiff, when she was hired by Hubbard Broadcasting,

236. See id. at 2-3.
237. See New York Stock Exchange Moves to End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-2 (Sept. 8, 1998).

238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. See Johnson v. Hubbard Broad. Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996).

242. 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996).
243. See Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 1449-50.
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she was required to sign an "agreement to hire" which stipulated that all
claims and disputes arising from all federal, state and local laws must be
submitted to arbitration.2 4 The agreement purported to cover all ADA,
ADEA and Title VII suits.245 The EEOC argued that, while individuals
can waive an existing Title VII claim if the waiver is made knowingly
and voluntarily, agreements that purport to waive rights prospectively
cannot be knowing and voluntary.26 Additionally, the Commission
contends that mandatory arbitration contravenes the policy goals of Title VII and that private litigation in court is integral to enforcement of
the statute.247
The EEOC filed a similar amici curiae brief more recently in support of the plaintiff in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.28 The District Court of Massachusetts agreed with the
EEOC's position and held that employees cannot be required, as a
condition of employment, to arbitrate Title VII claims, stating "[i]t is
similarly unlikely that the same Congress would in a single act [the
Civil Rights Act of 1991] create a new constitutioially-based right to a
jury trial for Title VII plaintiffs, only to erode that right by endorsing
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements."2 49
The EEOC also contends that an employer may not terminate or refuse to hire an employee who refuses to execute an arbitration agreement that interferes with an employee's Title VII rights.2'0 The EEOC's
position in this regard was preliminarily upheld in EEOC v. River Oaks
Imaging,z ' and a consent decree ultimately was entered. 2 Subsequently, "
the EEOC issued a policy statement on alternative dispute resolution. 2'
This statement, coupled with the EEOC's decision to empower the field
offices to seek temporary restraining orders in disparate treatment cases
without the approval of EEOC headquarters, will likely result in increased use of temporary restraining orders against employers in situations similar to River Oaks.

244. See id.
at 1450.

245. See id.
246. See id. at 1451.
247. See id. at 1459.
248. 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
249. Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 205.
250. See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex.

1995).
251.
252.
253.
No. 137,

67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
See River Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA) at 1243-44.
See EEOC Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
at E-13-14 (July 18, 1995).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss1/3

38

Delikat and Kathawala: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims Under Pre-Dispute
1998]

Arbitrationof Employment DiscriminationClaims

In fact, in its National Enforcement Plan issued in March 1996, the
EEOC declared that its second highest enforcement priority will be
cases that present unresolved issues of statutory interpretation or which
the federal courts of appeal differ in their interpretations, such as claims
that address whether binding arbitration of employment disputes can be
imposed as a condition of employment."
B. NationalLabor Relations Board
The Regional Director for Region Twelve of the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") recently sided with the EEOC and took the
position that mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts
should not be enforced. 5 In a case of first impression, the Regional Director considered but never issued a complaint against Bentley's Luggage Corporation because it implemented a mandatory ADR policy and
terminated an employee who refused to sign the agreement, on the
grounds that requiring employees to submit their disputes with management to binding arbitration is an unfair labor practice in violation of
the National Labor Relations Act. 2 6 While Bentley's was pending, the
Regional Director for Region Twelve of the NLRB filed its first administrative case challenging a binding arbitration clause in an employment
agreement which requires that the employee waive any right to resolve
employment disputes through trial by jury. *21
C. AdministrativeAgencies May Not Be Subject to Arbitration
Although Gilmer permits employers to compel arbitration with
employees who have signed valid agreements to arbitrate, there is some
question as to whether a governmental agency, such as the EEOC, that
files an action on behalf of an employee, can be required to arbitrate under such an agreement." 8

254. See EEOC Position on ADR Criticized, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at C-2-3 (Mar.
29, 1996).
255. See Lara Wozniak, Out-of-CourtSettlements Face Challenge In Court, ST. PErERSBURG
TImES, Sept. 16, 1996, at 12.
256. See Letwin v. Bentley's Luggage Corp., 12-CA-16658 (Region 12, Tampa Jan. 26,
1996); see also Wozniak, supranote 255 (reporting that the case settled in the interim).
257. See Great W. Bank v. Fathi, 12-CA-16886 (Region 12, Miami Jan. 26, 1996); see also
Wozniak, supranote 255 (reporting that the case is currently pending before a federal court).
258. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,2" the Supreme Court
recognized the EEOC's independent statutory authority to investigate
discrimination complaints and to bring its own charges against employers.21"The Court stressed that compelling arbitration of discrimination
disputes would not undermine the EEOC's role in enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.2 6' Accordingly, it made clear that an employee
subject to an arbitration agreement is not precluded from filing an administrative charge with the EEOC, and the EEOC retains its authority
to investigate
the claim and proceed through the administrative proc26
ess. 2
However, the Gilmer court did not address the issue of whether the
EEOC may institute a judicial action on behalf of an employee who is
otherwise subject to an arbitration agreement. The EEOC asserts that it
has independent authority to bring discrimination actions on behalf of a
claimant, and is not bound by a private arbitration agreement executed
by a claimant. 263 However, in a setback to the EEOC, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals recently affirmed a district court's dismissal of a suit
brought by the EEOC on behalf of a group of former investment bankers at Kidder, Peabody & Co. on the ground that the employees were
bound to arbitrate their claims. 64 In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,65
the EEOC sought only monetary relief on behalf of the plaintiffs since
Kidder, Peabody & Co. had discontinued its investment banking operations, precluding injunctive relief.' In a case of first impression, the
court held that while Gilmer reserved to the EEOC the right to bring actions seeking class-wide or injunctive relief, it precluded the EEOC
from seeking monetary relief on behalf of individuals who were subject
to valid arbitration agreements.267 The Second Circuit found that "to
permit an individual, who[, like the claimants before the Court,] has
freely agreed to arbitrate all employment claims, to make an end run
around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC pursue back pay

259. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
260. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 32.
263. See EEOC Guidance on Waivers Under Civil Rights Laws, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 71, at E-4 (Apr. 14, 1997). But see EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Mich. 1997), appealpending, No. 97-1698 (6th Cir.) (holding EEOC is
bound to agreement to arbitrate to the same extent that employee is bound).
264. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., No. 97-6316, 1998 WL 635699, at *4-*5 (2d Cir.
Aug. 28, 1998),petitionfor rehearingand suggestionfor rehearingen banc pending (2d Cir.).
265. No. 97-6316, 1998 WL 635699 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 1998).
266. See Kidder, 1998 WL 635699, at *3.
267. See id. at *4.
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or liquidated damages on his or her behalf would undermine the Gilmer
decision and the FAA." 268
V.

ARBITRATORS'

AUTHORITY TO RULE ON TRADITIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES

A. Courts are Split on Who DecidesIssues of Eligibility
Both the NYSE Arbitration Rules and the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure contain an "eligibility" rule which requires that arbitration claims be filed within six years. 69 In the past, securities industry
employers have sought injunctive relief against claimants who have
submitted claims to the NYSE or NASD relating to actions that occurred prior to six years from the date of submission.2 0 The federal
courts are split as to who decides issues of eligibility. 21
In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk 2 12 the Second Circuit decided that
eligibility under the NYSE and NASD arbitration procedures is an issue
for the courts to decide.27 3 Relying on First Options v. Kaplan,274 the
court held that the issue of arbitrability was for the court, absent "clear
and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' contrary intent.27s The Court
went to great lengths to avoid interpreting the NYSE and NASD rules,
stating that under New York law, they were not incorporated within the
terms of the Form U-4.1 6 Therefore, considering the Form U-4 alone,
the Court found that the language requiring277arbitration of "any and all
controversies" includes issues of eligibility.
The First, Fifth and Eighth Circuits agree that eligibility is an issue
for the arbitrators.2 8 The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that eligibility is to be arbitrated. 9

268. m at *5.
269. See New York Stock Exchange Guide-Arbitration Rules, Rule 603; NASD ManualCode of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10304.
270. See supra notes 247, 248; PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996);
First Options v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
271. See supranote 240.
272. 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).
273. See Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1198.
274. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
275. See Bybyk 81 F.3d at 1198-99.
276. See id. at 1201.
277. See id. at 1202.
278. See PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996); Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v.
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The Second Circuit generally follows the First Options dichotomy

that the arbitrator decides what is arbitrable and the court decides only
whether the parties have agreed to be bound by arbitration."' ° Recently,

New York state courts have followed suit, allowing eligibility issues to
be decided in arbitration.2 1
B. Who Decides Whether the PartiesHave Agreed to Arbitrate: the
Courtor the Jury?

The overwhelming majority of courts hold that the issue of whether
the parties have agreed to arbitrate is one for the courts. 2 However, under the FAA, a party seeking to avoid arbitration may request a jury trial
on the issue of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.23
Section 4 of the FAA directs a court to hold a jury trial "[i]f the
making of the arbitration agreement.., be in issue.'" Moreover, the
court may order discovery prior to commencement of the trial on the issue of the validity of the agreement." 5 This right, however, is not automatic.26 The party seeking the jury trial has the burden of establishing
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the making of
the agreement.' "To make a genuine issue entitling the plaintiff to a
trial by jury, an unequivocal denial that the agreement had been made
Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1994).
279. See Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that eligibility is
decided by the courts only when the arbitration agreement does not manifest clear and unmistakable intent that the issue be subject to arbitration); Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 78 F.3d 474, 478 (10th Cir. 1996); Smith Barney v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383-84 (11th Cir. 1995);
PaineWebber v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993). Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this particular issue, it has held that the NASD's previous five year rule was an issue for
the arbitrators. See O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.
1982).
280. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (punitive damages);
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2512 (1997) (collateral estoppel).
281. See Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1997).
282. See, e.g., Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992); Three
Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1991). But see
Hall v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 711, 712 (D. Md. 1989) (arbitrators decide
issue).
283. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
284. Il
285. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
365 (1997).
286. See id
287. See id.
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was needed, and some evidence should have been produced to substantiate the denial.""
Moreover, the party opposing arbitration must request a jury trial
on the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement within the five
day notice period set out in section 4 of the FAA.2 9 Failure to make a
timely request for such a trial will result in a waiver.29
VI. A SURVEY OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION ARBITRATION AWARDS
In light of the fact that employment claims between registered securities representatives and their firms have been arbitrable for many
years, and that such claims may be arbitrable outside of the securities
industry as well, it is useful to examine the types of awards that have
been rendered in such cases. Intuitively, one would assume that having
these claims heard before a panel of arbitrators familiar with the securities industry would generally provide a more balanced forum for the
resolution of these disputes. In fact, an unofficial survey of securities
industry arbitrations demonstrates that awards vary as widely as jury
verdicts.Y
The unofficial survey was conducted by Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP and examines 437 claims involving discrimination in
NASD and NYSE arbitrations from January 1989 through August 1998.
The data is compiled from the SecuritiesArbitration Commentator, P.O.
Box 112, Maplewood, New Jersey 07040 and the Westlaw database.Y
Although not exhaustive, this survey sheds some light on how employers and employees have fared in arbitrating discrimination and wrongful
termination claims.

288. T&R Enters., Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 613 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980)

(denying trial where plaintiff submitted agreement that included arbitration provision with complaint); see also Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 695 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying
trial where plaintiffs own affidavit conceded execution of Form U-4). But cf PMC, Inc. v.
Atomergic Chemetals Corp., 844 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affid, 122 F.3d 1057 (2d Cir.
1995) (genuine issue asserted as to whether plaintiff's employee had authority to bind plaintiff to
arbitration agreement).
289. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
290. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 609 (2d Cir.
1969); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
291. See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Summary of Securities Arbitration Awards in
Employment Cases (1998) (unofficial survey on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law
Journal).
292. See id.
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In the NASD arbitrations surveyed, for example, employers prevailed in 72 out of 104 (69.23%) discrimination claims. 2 Employers
prevailed in 94 out of the 141 (66.67%) wrongful termination claims asserted in NASD arbitrations. 29 4 In some of the arbitrations, claimants asserted claims for both employment discrimination and wrongful termination.2 " Therefore, the number of discrimination claims and wrongful
termination claims asserted may total more than the number of arbitrations surveyed. Similarly, in the NYSE arbitrations surveyed, employers
prevailed on the discrimination issue in 39 out of 67 cases (58.21%).96
In wrongful termination claims,2 9the employer was successful in defeating 67 out of 134 (50%) claims. 1
Awards for prevailing claimants have generally been higher for
wrongful termination claims than for discrimination claims. 98 For example, in 1990 one NASD panel awarded a claimant $38,000,000 for
claims of wrongful termination, breach of contract, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 " While this award is aberrationally large, the survey reveals five additional awards of one million
plus dollars for wrongful termination claims.W One NYSE panel
awarded $2,176,000 on claims of discrimination and harassment for five
claimants.Y Moreover, a panel of arbitrators in South Dakota ordered
Merrill Lynch to pay $1.8 million to the former manager of its Sioux
Falls office after determining that the investment firm discriminated on
the basis of age when it demoted him in 1991. In general, however,
the NASD and NYSE awards tend to be less than six figures' 0 In total,
employees in both NASD and NYSE arbitrations prevailed on at least
one of their claims in 188 out of the 437 cases (43.36%) overall.",
With respect to the award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees,
the majority of arbitration awards are not broken down into components, so it is difficult to determine the portion of the award that is allocated to a particular type of damages or fees. However, of those cases

293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, supra note 291.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, supra note 291.
302. See Age Discrimination:ArbitrationPanelAwards $1.8 Million to ManagerDemoted by
Merrill Lynch, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at A-5 to A-6 (Jan. 7, 1997).
303. See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, supranote 291.
304. See id.
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where the awards are broken down into components, punitive damages
appear to be awarded most frequently in arbitrations involving defamation claims." 5
Finally, a 1993 survey of 4,000 AAA arbitrations conducted in
1992 countered the charge that arbitration awards generally fall in the
middle of the request sought by the claimant.3°6 In only eleven percent of
the cases did the award fall between forty percent to fifty-nine percent
of the claim.3 w In twenty-six percent of the cases, the award exceeded
eigthy percent of the claim and in ten percent of the cases, it fell below
twenty percent. °s
VII. IMPLEMENTING A SYSTEM OF MANDATORY, PRE-DISPUE
ARBITRATION

The use of arbitration as an alternative to litigation depends upon
the parties agreeing that their dispute will be resolved through arbitration.3 9 Such an agreement may occur prior to the dispute arising ("predispute" arbitration), such as in the case of a registered employee who
agrees, pursuant to his Form U-4, to abide by the rules of the exchanges
with which he registers, including the arbitration rules."' Alternatively,
the parties may reach such an agreement when a controversy arises. "
Regardless of whether the agreement is reached pre- or postdispute, it must normally be reduced to writing, unless a written agreement is not required by law. 2 Employers should consider addressing a
variety of issues in arbitration agreements such as what disputes will be

305. See id.
306. See Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby" in Rendering Awards, WORLD AR1. & MEDIATION REP., Oct. 1993, at 241.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (finding
that arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties); see also Nantucket Indus., Inc. v.
Varon, 129 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that claims held outside scope of arbitration agreement where they occurred prior to Nov. 1, 1992, and employment agreement including arbitration
clause not effective until Nov. 1, 1992).
310. See Scott v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 3749, 1992 WL
245506, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1992).
311. See Kurschus v. PaineWebber, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1652, 1996 WL 389303, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1996).
312. See, e.g., Lepera v. lIT Corp., No. 97-1461, 1997 WL 535165, at *4, *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
11, 1997) (applying New York law, court held at-will employee agreed to arbitration policy by
continuing to work after receipt of policy, noting New York does not require written arbitration
agreements).
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arbitrated, who will serve as arbitrator, where will any arbitration take
place, when or on what time schedule will it be administered, and how
or by what procedures will it be conducted. Specifically, employers
should consider the following in their arbitration policies:
1. the employer should bear the full costs of arbitration;
2. specify the arbitration organization to administer the arbitration,
ensure that the arbitrators are perceived to be, and are in fact, impartial,
and establish the number of arbitrators to hear the case;
3. establish the location of the arbitration as well as which rules
shall govern issues not covered by the parties' arbitration agreement;
4. include a choice of law provision;
5. specify the nature of the claims to be arbitrated, including express reference to employment disputes and/or specific statutory claims
such as Title VII and ADEA;
6. notify employees of their right to representation by an attorney;
7. provide for sufficient pre-arbitration discovery to ensure a fair
proceeding;
8. allow for pre-hearing dispositive motions;
9. require the arbitrator to issue a written opinion specifying factual and legal bases for the award;
10. limit arbitral authority to, and require the arbitrator to adhere
to, applicable law, including the allocation of burden of proof as well as
substantive law such as employment at-will;
11. empower the arbitrator to award the full panoply of remedies
that the court could award under applicable statutes, e.g., reinstatement
and punitive damages;
12. allow employees sufficient time to read and understand the
agreement and incorporated policies;
13. provide employees with a copy of the agreement and any incorporated policies or rules;
14. encourage employees to ask questions; and
15. require employees to sign a receipt acknowledging that they
have read and understand the policy and explain to employees that they
are executing an agreement to arbitrate all or specific categories of employment disputes.
The incentive for employers to draft precise arbitration agreements
is highlighted by abundant case law revealing that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues will be resolved in favor of arbitration.
For example, in American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal
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Imaging Inc., '" the court gave the arbitration clause an expansive reading to encompass certain state common law claims, such as an employee's breach of fiduciary duty, and the tortious interference of a
contractual relationship." 4 Thus, incorporation of a broad arbitration
provision may prevent the employer from later claiming that the arbitrator does not have authority to decide these claims and that an employee's employment claim should be decided in a court of law.
Some arbitration organizations have developed guidelines for arbitrations conducted under their auspices to insure that such arbitrations
are fair to employees. In 1995, JAMS/Endispute, a leading arbitration
organization, set minimum standards of procedural fairness that must be
met before the organization will accept an assignment to arbitrate an
employment-related dispute."' Employers might wish to consider these
minimum standards as guidelines in drafting their own arbitration poli-

cies. JAMS/Endispute requires that a company policy under which all
employees are compelled to submit their employment disputes to arbitration:
1. afford individuals the same rights and remedies in arbitration
that would be available to them under the applicable statute or law, e.g.,
reinstatement, backpay, damages, etc., unless the individual employee
would retain the right to pursue in court any remedies unavailable in
arbitration, such as exemplary damages;
2. provide for a neutral arbitrator, and allow the employee to participate in selection of the arbitrator;
313. 96 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1996).
314. See American Recovery, 96 F.3d at 93; see also Weinstein v. The Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 158,186, 87,664 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that employer's allegedly defamatory statements concerned conduct occurring during plaintiffs employment; since
resolution of case required evaluation of plaintiff's job performance, the matter was plainly fit for
arbitration); Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald, 658 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that
claims for emotional distress based on termination involve evaluation of job performance and,
thus, are appropriate for arbitration); Austin v. U S West, Inc., 926 P.2d 181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
(claim by employees for fraud in the inducement and outrageous conduct were based on allegations that defendants misrepresented type and quality of benefits the company would provide its
employees, subjects specifically addressed in the plaintiffs' employment agreements). But see
Slade v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 647 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (employee who ran
single person sales office was not an "associated person," as defined by the NASD Code, and
therefore, could not be compelled to arbitrate wrongful discharge claim pursuant to Form U-4);
Van Weber v. Hall, 929 S.W.2d 138 ('rex. CL App. 1996) (employee claims for breach of contract,
fraud, conspiracy, conversion, unconscionability and quantum meruit were not subject to arbitration because they arose out of the company's annual sales plan and not the employment agreement
containing the arbitration provision).
315. See Michael D. Young, Selected J.A.M.S.IEndispute Materials, SC59 A.L.I. 911 (Mar.
12, 1998).
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3. make clear that the employee has the right to be represented by
counsel;
4. provide for a minimum level of discovery, including document
exchange and the deposition of the employee and the individual responsible for the adverse employment action; and
5. ensure that the employee has the right to present his or her
proof, through testimony and documentary evidence, and through crossexamination." 6
JAMS/Endispute recommends that the arbitration policy require
the arbitrators to render a written opinion or at least a "concise explanation of the basis of the award," particularly in cases involving the adjudication317of statutory rights, such as those afforded under Title VII or the
ADEA.
On May 10, 1995, an ADR task force formed in response to a
resolution adopted by the American Bar Association (the "ABA") released a protocol agreement designed to ensure due process in the me31
diation and arbitration of statutory rights involving nonunion workers.
This protocol agreement may also guide employers in drafting predispute arbitration agreements. The protocol reflects the task force's
recommendations that employees be given the right to representation of
their choice and to adequate but limited pre-hearing discovery, that the
arbitrators be authorized to award any relief that would be available in
court, that the pool of arbitrators and mediators be demographically diverse, skilled in the conduct of hearings and knowledgeable in the employment statutes at issue." 9 The task force could not reach a consensus
on whether an agreement to mediate should be a condition of employment, whether employees should be permitted to waive their right to
bring their claim in court, and whether agreements requiring arbitration
or mediation of employment disputes should be entered into
at the
30
arises.
dispute
a
after
only
or
employment
of
commencement
The protocol agreement has been endorsed by the AAA, the ABA,
the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution and the American Civil Liberties Union.32"'

316. See id. at 938-39.
317. See id. at 939.
318. See Arbitration: ADR Task Force Approves Prototype for Arbitration of Statutory
Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at D-14 (May 11, 1995).
319. See PrototypeAgreement on Job Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at
D-34 (May 11, 1995).
320. See id.
321. See Arbitration: ADR Task Force Approves Prototype for Arbitration of Statutory
Rights, supra note 319.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Although pre-dispute agreements requiring the submission of
statutory discrimination claims to arbitration are being challenged with
increasing frequency-in courts, by administrative agencies and in the
legislature-the debate on this important issue is far from over. At stake
is whether alternative dispute resolution will be a viable forum for the
disposition of many of these claims, or whether the court dockets will
become further clogged with an even greater number of discrimination
cases. The United States Supreme Court will play a significant role in
the resolution of this debate when it hears and decides Wright and when
it decides whether to grant certiorari in Duffield and the other cases that
are likely candidates for certiorari petitions. Congress, of course, could
also resolve the debate once and for all, although it is highly unlikely
that a Republican controlled Congress will amend the relevant statutes
to require that all claims of discrimination must be heard by a jury.
Until such time as these issues are settled by the Supreme Court and
Congress, the virtual flood of cases challenging pre-dispute arbitration
agreements will likely continue.
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